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Abstract—This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated
Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that
is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of
the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players
are independently chosen according to the initial probabilities,
and are kept the same all through the game. At every stage,
players simultaneously choose actions, and announce their actions
publicly. For finite horizon cases, an explicit linear program is
provided to compute players’ security strategies. Moreover, based
on the existing results in [1], this paper shows that a player’s
sufficient statistics, which is independent of the strategy of the
other player, consists of the belief over the player’s own type,
the regret with respect to the other player’s type, and the stage.
Explicit linear programs are provided to compute the initial
regrets, and the security strategies that only depends on the
sufficient statistics. For discounted cases, following the same idea
in the finite horizon, this paper shows that a player’s sufficient
statistics consists of the belief of the player’s own type and the
anti-discounted regret with respect to the other player’s type.
Besides, an approximated security strategy depending on the
sufficient statistics is provided, and an explicit linear program to
compute the approximated security strategy is given. This paper
also obtains a bound on the performance difference between the
approximated security strategy and the security strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many strategic decision-making situations, players do not
have complete information about the other decision-makers’
characteristics or payoffs. This kind of situations is typically
modeled as as so-called Bayesian game, in which each player
has a type whose realization is privately observed, although a
prior distribution is common knowledge.
In most prior work in the literature of Bayesian games,
one player’s belief on the types of the other players plays
an important role in figuring out the Nash equilibrium or the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Generally speaking, a player’s
belief of the other players’ type depends on the other players’
strategies. A special class of Bayesian games in which the
common information based beliefs are strategy independent
was considered in [2]. Because of the decoupling between the
strategies and the beliefs, a backward induction algorithm was
given to find Nash equilibria of the game. The cases when the
beliefs of the players are strategy dependent were considered
in [3], [4]. Both papers used perfect Bayesian equilibrium as
their solution concept. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists
of a strategy profile and a belief system such that the strategies
are sequential rational given the belief system and the belief
system is consistent given the strategy profile [5]. Based on
the common information based belief system, [3] studied
common information based perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and
[4] studied structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Backward
recursive formulas were given in both papers to find the
corresponding perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Bayesian games are also called games with incomplete
information, and were studied in [6], [1], [7]. This prior
work mainly studied two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian
games, which are the most closely related to the present work.
In two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games, minmax
value, maxmin value, and game value are examined. Minmax
value and maxmin value are also called the security level
of the minimizer and the maximizer, respectively [8]. The
strategy that guarantees the security level of the maximizer is
called the security strategy of the maximizer, and the strategy
assuring the security level of the minimizer is called the
security strategy of the minimizer. When minmax value equals
to maxmin value, we say the game has a value. In other
words, there exists a Nash equilibrium, which is the security
strategy pair. It was shown that the Nash equilibrium exists
for both finite horizon and discounted two-player zero-sum
repeated Bayesian games, but may not exist in infinite horizon
average payoff two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games
[6]. Later, [1], [9] provided backward recursive formulas to
compute the game value for finite horizon case and discounted
case. In the same paper, dual games of two-player zero-sum
repeated Bayesian games were also studied. Besides backward
recursive formulas, it was shown that the security strategy of
a player in the dual game with special initial parameters is
also the player’s security strategy in the primal game, and that
the security strategy only depends on the sufficient statistics
consisting of the belief on the player’s own type, a real vector
with the same size as that of the other player’s type set, and
the stage if this is a finite horizon game. The physical meaning
of the real vector in the primal game was not clear in [1], [9].
This paper adopts the same game model as the one used
in [6], [9], [7], [1], and focuses on developing prescriptive
methods for players, i.e. computing the security strategies of
players. The main contribution of this paper includes three
aspects. First, this paper clarifies that the real vector in a
player’s self-dependent sufficient statistics is the player’s regret
on the other player’s type. Given the type k of the other player,
a player’s regret on k is the difference between the expected
total payoff realized so far and the expected total payoff over
all time using the security strategy if the other player is of type
k. Second, explicit linear program formulations are provided
to compute the initial condition of the self-dependent sufficient
statistics and the security strategies. Third, in discounted
cases when approximated security strategies are provided,
the performance difference between the approximated security
strategy and the security strategy is shown to be bounded.
This paper considers the following two-player zero-sum
2repeated Bayesian games. Each player has his own type that
is only known to himself. The one-stage payoff function
depends on both players’ types and actions. At the beginning
of the game, Nature chooses each player’s type independently
according to some publicly known probability, and send the
type to the corresponding player. The players then choose
their actions simultaneously based on their own types and
both players’ history actions at every stage. The reward of
the maximizer is the sum of the one-stage payoffs all over
the stages in a finite stage game, and the sum of discounted
one-stage payoffs in a discounted game.
For the finite horizon case, we first provide an explicit linear
program to compute players’ security strategies based on the
idea of realization plan in sequence form. Since the computed
security strategy depends on both players’ history actions, and
the dimension of the history action space grows exponentially
with the time horizon, prohibitive memory may be needed
to record the strategies associated with the exponentially
growing history action space as the time horizon increases.
To save the memory, we provide the self-dependent sufficient
statistics for players. Every player only needs to record the
sufficient statistics whose size is time invariant, and computes
the corresponding security strategy at every step. Based on
the study in [1], this paper shows that the sufficient statistics
consists of the player’s belief on his/her own type and the
player’s regret on the other player’s type. Besides, explicit
linear programs are presented to compute the initial regrets
in the game, and the security strategies based on the self-
dependent sufficient statistics. Simulation results show that
the two security strategies developed from different methods
achieve the same game value.
For the discounted case, the self-dependent sufficient statis-
tics consists of the belief on a player’s own type and the anti-
discounted regret on the other player’s type. An approximated
security strategy that depends on the self-dependent sufficient
statistics is provided, and a linear program is given to compute
the approximated security strategy. Moreover, the performance
difference between the approximated security strategy and the
security strategy is studied, and a bound on the performance
difference is presented.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the main results for finite horizon games. Section III
discusses discounted games. Section IV demonstrates the main
results on a jamming problem in underwater sensor networks.
Finally, section V provides some future work.
II. T -STAGE REPEATED BAYESIAN GAMES
Let Rn denote the n-dimensional real space. For a finite
set K , |K| and ∆(K) denotes its cardinality and the set
of probability distributions over K , respectively. Symbols 1
and 0 denote appropriately dimensional column vectors whose
elements are all 1 and 0, respectively. Let v(0), v(1), . . . be
a sequence of real values. We adopt the convention that∑0
t=1 v(t) = 0, and
∏0
t=1 v(t) = 1. The supremum norm of
a function f : D → R is defined as ‖f‖sup = supx∈D |f(x)|,
where D is a non-empty set.
A two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian game is specified
by the seven-tuple (K,L,A,B,M, p0, q0), where
• K and L are non-empty finite sets, called player 1 and
2’s type sets, respectively.
• A and B are non-empty finite sets, called player 1 and
2’s action sets, respectively.
• M : K×L×A×B → R is the one-stage payoff function.
Mkl indicates the payoff matrix given player 1’s type
k ∈ K and player 2’s type l ∈ L. The element Mkla,b of
matrix Mkl, also denoted as M(k, l, a, b), is the payoff
given player 1’s type k ∈ K and action a ∈ A, and player
2’s type l ∈ L and action b ∈ B.
• p0 ∈ ∆(K) and q0 ∈ ∆(L) are the initial probabilities
on K and L, respectively. Without loss of generality, we
assume pk0 , q
l
0 > 0 for any k ∈ K and l ∈ L.
A T -stage repeated Bayesian game is played as follows.
Let at, bt denote player 1 and player 2’s actions at stage
t = 1, . . . , T , respectively. At stage 1, k and l are chosen
independently according to p0 and q0, and communicated to
player 1 and 2, respectively. After the types are chosen, at stage
t = 1, . . . , T , each player chooses his action independently,
and announces it publicly. The payoff of player 1 at stage
t is M(k, l, at, bt). At stage t = 1, . . . , T , player 1 and 2’s
history action sequences hAt and h
B
t are defined as h
A
t =
(a1, . . . , at−1) and h
B
t = (b1, . . . , bt−1), and their history
action spaces are defined as HAt = A
t−1 and HBt = B
t−1,
respectively. We assume that HA1 , H
B
1 , H
A
0 , H
B
0 = ∅. With
a little abuse of the terminology ∈, we use as ∈ hAt and
hAs ∈ h
A
t to indicate as and h
A
s are player 1’s action
and history action sequence at stage s in the history action
sequence hAt for any s = 1, . . . , t − 1. Similarly, bs ∈ h
B
t
and hBs ∈ h
B
t means that bs and h
B
s are player 2’s action
and history action sequence at stage s in the history action
sequence hBt for any s = 1, . . . , t− 1.
A behavior strategy for player 1 is an element of σ =
(σt)
T
t=1, where σt is a map from K × H
A
t × H
B
t to ∆(A).
Similarly, a behavior strategy for player 2 is an element of
τ = (τt)
T
t=1, where τt is a map from L × H
A
t × H
B
t to
∆(B). Denote by Σ and T the sets of strategies of player
1 and 2, respectively. Denote by σatt (·, ·, ·) and τ
bt
t (·, ·, ·) the
probabilities of playing at and bt at stage t, respectively.
A quadruple (p0, q0, σ, τ) induces a probability distribution
Pp0,q0,σ,τ on the set Ω = K × L × (A × B)
T of plays.
Ep0,q0,σ,τ stands for the corresponding expectation. The payoff
with initial probabilities p0, q0 and strategies σ, τ of the T -
stage repeated Bayesian game is defined as γT (p0, q0, σ, τ) =
Ep0,q0,σ,τ
(∑T
t=1M(k, l, at, bt)
)
.
The T -stage game ΓT (p0, q0) is defined as a two-player
zero-sum repeated Bayesian game equipped with initial distri-
bution p0 and q0, strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function
γT (p0, q0, σ, τ). In this game, player 1 wants to maximize the
payoff γT (p0, σ, τ), while player 2 wants to minimize it.
Consider a T -stage game ΓT (p0, q0). The security level
V T (p0, q0) of player 1 is defined as V T (p0, q0) =
maxσ∈Σminτ∈T γT (p0, q0, σ, τ), and the strategy σ
∗ ∈ Σ
which achieves player 1’s security level is called the se-
curity strategy of player 1. Similarly, the security level
V T (p0, q0) of player 2 is defined as V T (p0, q0) =
minτ∈T maxσ∈Σ γT (p0, q0σ, τ), and the strategy τ
∗ ∈ T
3which achieves player 2’s security level is called the security
strategy of player 2. When V T (p0, q0) = V T (p0, q0), we
say game ΓT (p0, q0) has a value, i.e. the game has a Nash
equilibirum. Since game ΓT (p0, q0) is a finite game, it always
has a value denoted by VT (p0, q0) [9].
A. LP formulations for players’ security strategies
A T -stage Bayesian repeated game is a finite game, and its
security strategy can be computed by solving a linear program
based on the sequence form [10]. The linear program provided
in [10], however, can not be directly used, because in our case,
the strategies of both players depend on their own types which
is not the same situation as in [10]. Therefore, we adopt the
idea of realization plan in the sequence form, and construct an
explicit linear program for T -stage Bayesian repeated games.
Let us first introduce the realization plan. Define player 1
and 2’s realization plan xat
k,hAt ,h
B
t
and ybt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
as
xat
k,hAt ,h
B
t
= pk
t∏
s=1
σass (k, h
A
s , h
B
s ), ∀t = 0, . . . , T (1)
ybt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
= ql
t∏
s=1
τbss (l, h
A
s , h
B
s ), ∀t = 0, . . . , T (2)
where as, h
A
s ∈ h
A
t and bs, h
A
s ∈ h
A
t for all s =
1, . . . , t − 1. It is easy to verify that the joint prob-
ability P (k, l, hAt+1, h
B
t+1) satisfies P (k, l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1) =
xat
k,hAt ,h
B
t
ybt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
, where at, h
A
t ∈ h
A
t+1 and bt, h
B
t ∈
hBt+1. Let xt = (xk,hAt ,hBt )k∈K,hAt ∈HAt ,hBt ∈HBt and yt =
(yl,hAt ,hBt )l∈L,hAt ∈HAt ,hBt ∈HBt . Denote by x = (xt)
T
t=1 and
y = (yt)
T
t=1 player 1 and 2’s realization plans over all the
T -stage Bayesian game. Player 1’s realization plan x satisfies
constraint (3-4), and the corresponding set is denoted by X .
Similarly, player 2’s realization plan y satisfies constraint (5-
6), and the corresponding set is denoted by Y .
1
Txk,hAt ,hBt =x
at−1
k,hA
t−1,h
B
t−1
, (3)
xk,hAt ,hBt ≥0, (4)
for all t = 1, . . . , T , k ∈ K , hAt ∈ H
A
t , and h
B
t ∈ H
B
t .
1
T yl,hAt ,hBt =y
bt−1
l,hA
t−1,h
B
t−1
, (5)
yl,hAt ,hBt ≥0, (6)
for all t = 1, . . . , T , l ∈ L, hAt ∈ H
A
t , and h
B
t ∈ H
B
t .
With perfect recall, for either player, looking for a security
strategy is the same as looking for a realization plan that
achieves the security level of the player [10].
Given player 1’s realization plan, define player 1’s weighted
future security payoff uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
(x) for t = 0, . . . , T as
uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
(x) = min
τt+1:T (l)∈Tt+1:T (l)
∑
k∈K
xat
k,hAt ,h
B
t
E
(
T∑
s=t+1
M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1
)
, (7)
where hAt+1 = (h
A
t , at), h
B
t+1 = (h
B
t , bt), τt+1:T (l) = (τs(l, :
, :))Ts=t+1, and Tt+1:T (l) is the set of player 2’s behavior
strategies from t + 1 to T given player 2’s type l. The pairs
(hAt , at) and (h
B
t , bt) indicate concatenation. Similarly, define
player 2’s weighted future security payoff wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
(y) as
wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
(y) = max
σt+1:T (k)∈Σt+1:T (k)
∑
l∈L
ybt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
E
(
T∑
s=t+1
M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1
)
, (8)
for t = 0, . . . , T where σt+1:T (k) = (σs(k, :, :))
T
s=t+1, and
Σt+1:T (k) is the set of player 1’s strategies from stage t+ 1
to T given player 1’s type k ∈ K .
For t = 1, . . . , T , ul,hAt ,hBt (x), wk,hAt ,hBt (y) are |A| × |B|
matrices whose elements are uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
(x) and wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
(y), re-
spectively. For t = 0, since at, bt, h
A
t , h
B
t ∈ ∅, ul,hAt ,hBt (x) and
wk,hAt ,hBt (y) are scalars, and denoted as ul,0(x) and wk,0(y),
respectively. Define ut(x) = (ul,hAt ,hBt (x))l∈L,hAt ∈HAt ,hBt ∈HBt ,
and u(x) = (ut(x))
T−1
t=1 . Similarly, define wt(y) =
(wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
(y))k∈K,hAt ∈HAt ,hBt ∈HBt , and w(y) = (wt(y))
T−1
t=1 .
For the convenience of the rest of this paper, let U and W be
the real spaces of appropriate dimensions which u and w take
values in. The weighted future security payoffs u,w satisfy
backward recursive formulas.
Lemma 1. Consider a T -stage Bayesian game ΓT (p, q).
Player 1 and 2’s weighted future security payoffs uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
(x)
and wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
(y) defined in (7) and (8) satisfy
uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
(x) = min
τt+1(l,hAt+1,h
B
t+1)∈∆(B)
(∑
k∈K
xT
k,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
Mkl
+1Tul,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
(x)
)
τt+1(l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1), (9)
wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
(y) = max
σt+1(k,hAt+1,h
B
t+1)∈∆(A)
σt+1(k, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1)
T
(∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ wk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
(y)1
)
, (10)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, where hAt+1 = (h
A
t , at), h
B
t+1 =
(hAt , bt), xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
∈ R|A| is player 1’s realization plan
whose element is defined as in (1), and yl,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
∈ R|B| is
player 2’s realization plan whose element is defined as in (2).
Here, (hAt , at) and (h
A
t , bt) indicate concatenation.
Proof. According to equation (7), we have
u
aT−1,bT−1
l,hA
T−1,h
B
T−1
(x)
= min
τT (l,hAT ,h
B
T
)∈∆(B)
∑
k∈K
x
aT−1
k,hA
T−1,h
B
T−1
σTT (k, h
A
T , h
B
T )M
kl
τT (l, h
A
T , h
B
T )
= min
τT (l,hAT ,h
B
T
)∈∆(B)
∑
k∈K
xT
k,hA
T
,hB
T
MklτT (l, h
A
T , h
B
T )
= min
τT (l,hAT ,h
B
T
)∈∆(B)
(∑
k∈K
xT
k,hA
T
,hB
T
Mkl + 1Tul,hA
T
,hB
T
(x)
)
τT (l, h
A
T , h
B
T ).
The last equality holds because ul,hA
T
,hB
T
(x) is a zero matrix.
4Suppose equation (9) holds for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Consider the case of t− 1.
u
at−1,bt−1
l,hA
t−1,h
B
t−1
(x)
= min
τt:T (l)∈Tt:T (l)
∑
k∈K
x
at−1
k,hA
t−1,h
B
t−1
(
σTt (k, h
A
t , h
B
t )M
kl
τt(l, h
A
t , h
B
t ) +
∑
at∈A
∑
bt∈B
P (at, bt|k, l, h
A
t , h
B
t )
E(
T∑
s=t+1
M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l, h
A
t , h
B
t , at, bt)
)
= min
τt(l,hAt ,h
B
t )∈∆(B)
{∑
k∈K
xT
k,hAt ,h
B
t
Mklτt(l, h
A
t , h
B
t )
+
∑
at∈A
∑
bt∈B
τbtt (l, h
A
t , h
B
t ) min
τt+1:T (l)∈Tt+1:T (l)
∑
k∈K
xat
k,hAt ,h
B
t
E
(
T∑
s=t+1
M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1
)}
= min
τt(l,hAt ,h
B
t )∈∆(B)
(∑
k∈K
xT
k,hAt ,h
B
t
Mkl + 1Tul,hAt ,hBt (x)
)
τt(l, h
A
t , h
B
t ).
Therefore, equation (9) holds for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Following the same steps, equation (10) can be shown.
Now, Let us present the explicit LP formulations.
Theorem 2. Consider a T -stage repeated Bayesian game
ΓT (p, q). The game value VT (p, q) satisfies
VT (p, q) = max
x∈X,u∈U,u:,0∈R|L|
∑
l∈L
qlul,0 (11)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA1 ,hB1 + ul,hA1 ,hB1
T
1 ≥ ul,01, ∀l ∈ L, (12)
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ ul,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
T
1 ≥ uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
1,
∀t = 1, . . . , T − 1, l ∈ L, hAt ∈ H
A
t , h
B
t ∈ H
B
t , (13)
where ul,hA
T
,hB
T
is a zero matrix for all l ∈ L, X is a set
including all real vectors satisfying (3-4), and U is a real
space of appropriate dimension. Player 1’s security strategy
σat∗t (k, h
A
t , h
B
t ) for all t = 1, . . . , T , k ∈ K , h
A
t ∈ H
A
t ,
hBt ∈ H
B
t , and at ∈ A satisfies
σatt
∗(k, hAt , h
B
t ) = x
at∗
k,hAt ,h
B
t
/x
at−1∗
k,hA
t−1,h
B
t−1
. (14)
Dually, the game value VT (p, q) also satisfies
VT (p, q) = min
y∈Y,w∈W,w:,0∈R|K|
∑
k∈K
pkwk,0 (15)
s.t.
∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA1 ,hB1 + wk,hA1 ,hB1 1 ≤ wk,01, ∀k ∈ K, (16)∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ wk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
1 ≤ wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
1,
∀t = 1, . . . , T − 1, k ∈ K,hAt ∈ H
A
t , h
B
t ∈ H
B
t , (17)
where wk,hA
T
,hB
T
is a zero matrix for all k ∈ K , Y is a set
including all real vectors satisfying (5-6), and W is a real
space of appropriate dimension. Player 2’s security strategy
τbt∗t (l, h
A
t , h
B
t ) for all t = 1, . . . , T , l ∈ L, h
A
t ∈ H
A
t , h
B
t ∈
HBt , and at ∈ A satisfies
τbt∗t (l, h
A
t , h
B
t ) = y
bt∗
l,hAt ,h
B
t
y
bt−1∗
l,hA
t−1,h
B
t−1
. (18)
Proof. Equation (7) indicates that VT (p, q) =
maxx∈X
∑
l∈L q
lul,0(x), where ul,0(x) satisfies (9).
According to the duality theory in LP problem, equation (9)
can be rewritten as
uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
(x) = max
u
at,bt
l,hA
t
,hB
t
∈R
uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
(19)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ uT
l,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
(x)1 ≥ uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
1,
∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1. (20)
For t = T − 1, since ul,hA
T
,hB
T
(x) is a zero matrix, we have
u
aT−1,bT−1
l,hA
T−1,h
B
T−1
(x) = max
u
aT−1,bT−1
l,hA
T−1
,hB
T−1
∈R
u
aT−1,bT−1
l,hA
T−1,h
B
T−1
, (21)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
T
,hB
T
≥ u
aT−1,bT−1
l,hA
T−1,h
B
T−1
1. (22)
For t = T − 2, we define
uˆ
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x) (23)
= max
u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2
,hB
T−2
∈R
u
l,(hA
T−2
,aT−2),(h
B
T−2
,bT−2)
∈R|A|×|B|
u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(24)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
T−1,h
B
T−1
+ uT
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
1
≥ u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
1, (25)∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
T
,hB
T
≥ u
aT−1,bT−1
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
1,
∀aT−1 ∈ A, bT−1 ∈ B. (26)
We will show that u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x) = uˆ
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x). Equa-
tion (19) implies that
u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x) = max
u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2
,hB
T−2
∈R
u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(27)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
T−1,h
B
T−1
+ u∗T
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
1
≥ u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
1, (28)
where the element in u∗
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
is the corre-
sponding maximum of LP (21-22).
Let u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
⋆
, u⋆
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
be
the optimal solution to LP problem (24-26). Since
u⋆
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
satisfies equation (26) and
hence (22), we have u
aT−1,bT−1
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
∗
≥
u
aT−1,bT−1
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
⋆
for any aT−1 ∈ A, bT−1 ∈ B.
Together with equation (25), we show that u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
⋆
5satisfies equation (28). Therefore, u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
⋆
,
u⋆
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
is a feasible solution to the nested
LP problem (27-28), and uˆ
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x) ≤ u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x).
Meanwhile, let u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
∗
, u∗
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
be the optimal solution to the nested LP (27-28). It is easy
to check that u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
∗
, u∗
l,(hA
T−2,aT−2),(h
B
T−2,bT−2)
is a feasible solution to LP (24-26), and hence
u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x) ≤ uˆ
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x). Therefore,
u
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x) = uˆ
aT−2,bT−2
l,hA
T−2,h
B
T−2
(x).
Following the same steps, we can show the case for t =
T − 3, . . . , 0, and have
ul,0(x) = max
ul,0∈R,u∈U
ul,0 (29)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA1 ,hB1 + u
T
l,hA1 ,h
B
1
1 ≥ ul,01, (30)
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ uT
l,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
1 ≥ uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
1,
∀t = 1, . . . , T − 1, hAt ∈ H
A
t , h
B
t ∈ H
B
t , (31)
and equation (11-13) is shown. From the definition of x in
(1), we derive player 1’s security strategy as in (14).
Following the same steps, we show equation (15-17) is true,
and player 2’s security strategy is computed as in (18).
Notice that the sizes of the LP formulations in (11-13) and
(15-17) are both linear in the size of the game tree, i.e. linear in
the sizes of both players’ type sets, polynomial in the sizes of
both players’ action sets, and exponential in the time horizon.
B. Security strategies based on fixed-sized sufficient statistics
and dual games
Theorem 2 provides LP formulations to compute both play-
ers’ security strategies which depend on both players’ history
actions. Notice that history action space grows exponentially
on time horizon which makes this LP formulation undesirable
as the horizon length grows. As time horizon gets long,
players need a great amount of memories to record players’
history action space and the corresponding security strategy. In
order to remedy this drawback, we now consider another type
of security strategies, which depend on fixed-sized sufficient
statistics to save memories.
Our starting point is a result of [11], [9], which showed
that a player’s security strategy in the dual game with some
special initial parameters is also the player’s security strategy
in the primal game, and the security strategy only depends on
a fixed-sized sufficient statistics. This subsection clarifies what
the special initial parameters in dual games mean in the primal
game, and give LP formulation and algorithms to compute the
initial parameters and the corresponding security strategies.
First of all, we would like to introduce two dual games of
a T -stage repeated Bayesian game ΓT (p, q). Game ΓT (p, q)’s
type 1 dual game Γ˜1T (µ, q) is defined with respect to its first
parameter p, where µ ∈ R|K| is called the initial regret with
respect to player 1’s type. The dual game Γ˜1T (µ, q) is played
as follows. Player 1 chooses k without informing player 2.
Independently, nature chooses player 2’s type according to q,
and announces it to player 2 only. From stage 1 to T , knowing
both players’ history actions, both players choose actions
simultaneously. Let p be player 1’s strategy to choose his own
type, and σ ∈ Σ and τ ∈ T be player 1 and 2’s strategies to
choose actions. Player 1’s payoff γ˜1T (µ, q, p, σ, τ) is defined as
γ˜1T (µ, q, p, σ, τ) = Ep,q,σ,τ
(
µk +
∑T
t=1M(k, l, at, bt)
)
. We
can see that the main difference between the type 1 dual game
and the primal game is that in type 1 dual game, player 1 has
an initial regret instead of a initial probability p, and he himself
instead of the nature chooses his own type.
Similarly, the type 2 dual game Γ˜2T (p, ν) is defined with
respect to the second parameter q, where ν ∈ R|L| is called
the initial regret with respect to player 2’s type. The dual game
Γ˜2T (p, ν) is played as follows. Player 2 chooses l without
informing player 1. Meanwhile, player 1’s type is chosen
according to p, and is only announced to player 1. From stage
1 to T , knowing both players’ history actions, both players
choose actions independently. Let q be player 2’s strategy to
choose his type l. Player 1’s payoff γ˜2T (p, ν, q, σ, τ) is defined
as γ˜2T (p, ν, q, σ, τ) = Ep,q,σ,τ
(
νl +
∑T
t=1M(k, l, at, bt)
)
. In
both dual games, player 1 wants to maximize the payoff, while
player 2 wants to minimize it.
Both dual games are finite, and hence have game values
denoted by V˜ 1T (µ, q) and V˜
2
T (p, ν). They are related to the
game value of the primal game in the following way [9].
V˜ 1T (µ, q) = max
p∈∆(K)
{VT (p, q) + p
Tµ}, (32)
VT (p, q) = min
µ∈R|K|
{V˜ 1T (µ, q)− p
Tµ}, (33)
V˜ 2T (p, ν) = min
q∈∆(L)
{VT (p, q) + q
T ν}, (34)
VT (p, q) = max
ν∈R|L|
{V˜ 2T (q, ν) − q
T ν}. (35)
Let µ∗ and ν∗ be the solutions to the optimal problems on
the right hand side of (33) and (35), respectively. Player 2’s
security strategy in the type 1 dual game Γ˜1T (µ
∗, q) is his
security strategy in the primal game ΓT (p, q), and player 1’s
security strategy in the type 2 dual game Γ˜2T (p, ν
∗) is also his
security strategy in the primal game ΓT (p, q) [1].
The next questions are what µ∗ and ν∗ are, and how
to compute them. To answer these questions, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a T -stage repeated Bayesian game
ΓT (p, q). Let σ
∗
p,q and τ
∗
p,q be player 1 and 2’s secu-
rity strategies in ΓT (p, q), respectively. Denote by x
∗
p,q and
y∗p,q the corresponding optimal realization plans of player
1 and 2. The optimal solution µ∗ to the optimal problem
minµ∈R|K|{V˜
1
T (µ, q)− p
Tµ} is
µ∗k = −wk,0(y
∗
p,q), ∀k ∈ K (36)
where wk,0(y
∗
p,q) = w
a0,b0
k,hA0 ,h
B
0
(y∗p,q), which is defined in (8)
and computed according to the linear program (15-17).
The optimal solution ν∗ to the optimal problem
maxν∈R|L|{V˜
2
T (q, ν)− q
T ν} is
ν∗l = −ul,0(x
∗
p,q), ∀l ∈ L (37)
6where ul,0(x
∗
p,q) = u
a0,b0
l,hA0 ,h
B
0
(x∗p,q), which is defined in (7) and
computed according to the linear program (11-13).
Proof. First, we prove that equation (38) is true.
VT (p, q) = p
Tw:,0(y
∗
p,q) = −p
Tµ∗. (38)
Equation (8) and (2) implies that
wk,0(y
∗
p,q) = max
σ(k)∈Σ(k)
∑
l∈L
qlEσ(k),y∗
l
(
T∑
s=1
M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l
)
Therefore, we have∑
k∈K
pkwk,0(y
∗
p,q)
=max
σ∈Σ
∑
k∈K
∑
l∈L
pkqlEσ(k),y∗
l
(
T∑
s=1
M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l
)
=max
σ∈Σ
Eσ,y∗
(
T∑
s=1
M(k, l, as, bs)
)
=min
y∈Y
max
σ∈Σ
Eσ,y
(
T∑
s=1
M(k, l, as, bs)
)
=min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
Eσ,τ
(
T∑
s=1
M(k, l, as, bs)
)
= VT (p, q)
where the second equality holds because y∗ is player 2’s
security realization plan, and the last equality holds because
of the perfect recall in this game [10].
Next, we show that
V˜ 1T (µ
∗, q) = 0. (39)
Equation (32) implies that V˜ 1T (µ
∗, q) =
maxp′∈∆(K){VT (p
′, q) + p′Tµ∗} ≥ VT (p, q) + pTµ∗ = 0.
Meanwhile, for any p′ ∈ ∆(K), we have
VT (p
′, q)
=min
y∈Y
max
σ∈Σ
Ep′,q,σ,y
(
T∑
t=1
M(k, l, at, bt)
)
≤ max
σ∈Σ
Ep′,q,σ,y∗p,q
(
T∑
t=1
M(k, l, at, bt)
)
=
∑
k∈K
p′k max
σ(k)∈Σ(k)
Eq,σ(k),y∗p,q
(
T∑
t=1
M(k, l, at, bt)|k)
=
∑
k∈K
p′kwk,0(y
∗
p,q) = −p
′Tµ∗,
which implies that VT (p
′, q)+ p′Tµ∗ ≤ 0 for any p′ ∈ ∆(K).
Hence, V˜ 1T (µ
∗, q) ≤ 0 according to (32). Therefore, equation
(39) is true.
Equation (39) implies that V˜ 1T (µ
∗, q) − pTµ∗ = −pTµ∗ =
VT (p, q), where the second equality is based on (38). Accord-
ing to equation (33), we see that −wk,0(y∗p,q) is an optimal
solution to the optimal problem on the right hand side of (33).
From the proof of Theorem 2, we see that w:,0(y
∗
p,q) = w
∗
:,0,
where w∗:,0 is the optimal solution to the linear program (15-
17).
Following the same steps, we show that
V˜ 2T (q, ν
∗) = 0, (40)
and −ul,0(x∗p,q) is an optimal solution to the optimal problem
on the right hand side of (35). Moreover, u:,0(x
∗
p,q) equals
to u∗:,0 the optimal solution to the linear program (11-13),
according to the proof of Theorem 2.
In the primal game, the parameter µ∗k can be seen as player
2’ initial regret given player 1’s type k, i.e. the difference
between the expected realized payoff before stage 1, which
is 0, and the expected total payoff using player 2’s security
strategy if player 1 is of type k. Parameter ν∗l is player 1’s
initial regret given player 2’s type l, i.e. the difference between
the expected realized payoff before stage 1 and the expected
total payoff using player 1’s security strategy if player 2 is
of type l. Now that we have figured out the two special
parameters in the dual game, our next step is to study the
security strategies in the dual games. In type 1 dual game
Γ˜1T (µ, q), player 2 keeps track of two variables, the belief state
qt ∈ ∆(L) on his own type, and his regret µt ∈ R|K| on player
1’s type. The belief on player 2’s type is defined as
qlt = P (l|k, h
A
t , h
B
t ), ∀l ∈ L, t = 1, . . . , T, (41)
and is updated as follows
qlt+1 =q
+l(bt, zt, qt) =
qltz
l
t(bt)
z¯qt,zt(bt)
, ∀l ∈ L,with q1 = q, (42)
where zlt = τt(l, h
A
t , h
B
t ) ∈ ∆(B), and z¯qt,zt(bt) =∑
l∈L q
l
tz
l
t(bt). The regret on player 1’s type is defined as
µkt = µ
k +
t−1∑
s=1
E(M(k, l, as, bs)|k, h
A
s+1, h
B
s+1),
for all k ∈ K, t = 1, . . . , T, and is updated as follows
µkt+1 =µ
+k(µt, at, bt, zt, qt)
=µkt + E(M(k, l, at, bt)|k, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1)
=µkt +
∑
l∈L
qlt+1M
kl
at,bt
, ∀k ∈ K,with µk1 = µ
k. (43)
If µk = µ∗k which takes the form as in (36), then µkt in
the primal game can be seen as the difference between the
expected realized payoff before stage t and the expected total
payoff using the security strategy if player 1 is of type k.
Player 2’s security strategy at stage t in Γ˜1T (µ, q) can be
computed based on the backward recursive equation (44), and
depends only on t, µt and qt [9].
V˜ 1n (µt, qt) = min
z∈∆(B)|L|
max
a∈A
∑
b∈B
z¯qt,z(b)
V˜ 1n−1(µ
+(µt, a, b, z, qt), q
+(b, z, qt)), (44)
where n = T + 1− t.
Similarly, in type 2 dual game Γ˜2T (p, ν), player 1 also
records two variables, the belief pt ∈ ∆(K) on player 1’s
type and the regret νt ∈ R
|L| on player 2’s type. The belief
on player 1’s type is defined as
pkt = P (k|l, h
A
t , h
B
t ), ∀k ∈ K, t = 1, . . . , T, (45)
7and is updated as below
pkt+1 =p
+k(at, rt, pt) =
pkt r
k
t (at)
r¯pt,rt(at)
, ∀k ∈ K, (46)
with p1 = p, where r
k
t = σt(k, h
A
t , h
B
t ) ∈ ∆(A), and
r¯pt,rt(at) =
∑
k∈K p
k
t r
k
t (at). The regret on player 2’s type
is defined as
νlt = ν
l +
t−1∑
s=1
E(M(k, l, as, bs)|l, h
A
s+1, h
B
s+1),
for all l ∈ L, t = 1, . . . , T , and is updated as below
νlt+1 =ν
+l(νt, at, bt, rt, pt)
=νlt + E(M(k, l, at, bt)|l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1)
=νl +
∑
k∈K
pkt+1M
kl
at,bt
, ∀l ∈ L,with νl1 = ν
l. (47)
If νl = ν∗l which takes the form of (37), then νlt in the primal
game can be seen as the difference between the expected
realized payoff before stage t and the expected total payoff
using the security strategy if player 2 is of type l.
Player 1’s security strategy at stage t in Γ˜2T (p, ν) can be
computed based on the backward recursive equation (48), and
depends only on t, pt and νt [9].
V˜ 2n (pt, νt) = max
r∈∆(A)|K|
min
b∈B
∑
a∈A
r¯pt,r(a)
V˜ 2n−1(p
+(a, r, pt), ν
+(νt, a, b, r, pt)), (48)
where n = T + 1− t.
From the analysis above, we see that the security strategies
of player 1 and 2 in the corresponding dual games depend only
on the fixed-sized sufficient statistics, (t, pt, νt) and (t, µt, qt),
respectively, at stage t. Moreover, the sufficient statistics
(t, pt, νt) and (t, µt, qt) are fully accessible to player 1 and
2, respectively, in the corresponding dual games. Based on
the LP formulation of VT (p, q), we give the LP formulations
to compute player 1’s security strategy in type 2 dual game
Γ˜2T (p, ν) and player 2’s security strategy in type 1 dual game
Γ˜1T (µ, q) as follows.
Theorem 4. Consider type 2 dual game Γ˜2T (p, ν). Let pt and
νt be the belief on player 1’s type and the regret on player 2’s
type at stage t, respectively. The game value V˜ 2n (pt, νt) of n
stage type 2 dual game Γ˜2n(pt, νt) satisfies the following LP
formulation, where n = T + 1− t.
V˜ 2n (pt, νt) = max
x∈X,u∈U,u:,0∈R|L|,u˜∈R
u˜ (49)
s.t.u:,0 + νt ≥ u˜1 (50)∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA1 ,hB1 + ul,hA1 ,hB1
T
1 ≥ ul,01, ∀l ∈ L, (51)
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ ul,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
T
1 ≥ uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
1,
∀t = 1, . . . , n− 1, l ∈ L, hAt ∈ H
A
t , h
B
t ∈ H
B
t , (52)
where ul,hAn ,hBn is a zero matrix for all l ∈ L, X is a set
including all real vectors satisfying (3-4) with xa0
k,hA0 ,h
B
0
= pkt ,
and U is a real space of appropriate dimension. Player 1’s
security strategy σ˜∗t (k, pt, νt) at stage t is
σ˜∗t (k, pt, νt) =
x∗
k,hA1 ,h
B
1
pkt
. (53)
Similarly, for type 1 dual game Γ˜1T (µ, q), let µt and qt be
the regret on player 1’s type and the belief on player 2’s type
at stage t. The game value V˜ 1n (µt, qt) of n stage type 1 dual
game Γ˜1n(µt, qt) satisfies the following LP formulation, where
n = T + 1− t.
V˜ 1n (µt, qt) = min
y∈Y,w∈W,w:,0∈R|K|,w˜∈R
w˜ (54)
s.t.w:,0 + µt ≤ w˜1, (55)∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA1 ,hB1 + wk,hA1 ,hB1 1 ≤ wk,01, ∀k ∈ K, (56)∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ wk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
1 ≤ wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t
1,
∀t = 1, . . . , n− 1, k ∈ K,hAt ∈ H
A
t , h
B
t ∈ H
B
t , (57)
where wk,hAn ,hBn is a zero matrix for all k ∈ K , Y is a set
including all real vectors satisfying (5-6) with yb0
l,hA0 ,h
B
0
= qlt,
and W is a real space of appropriate dimension. Player 2’s
security strategy τ˜∗t (l, µt, qt) at stage t is
τ˜∗t (l, µt, qt) =
y∗
l,hA1 ,h
B
1
qlt
. (58)
Proof. First, We have
V˜ 2n (pt, νt)
=max
x∈X
min
q∈∆(L)
min
τ∈T
∑
l∈L
ql
(
νlt + E(
n∑
s=1
M(k, l, as, bs)|l)
)
=max
x∈X
min
q∈∆(L)
∑
l∈L
ql
(
νlt + min
τ(l)∈T (l)
E(
n∑
s=1
M(k, l, as, bs)|l)
)
=max
x∈X
min
q∈∆(L)
∑
l∈L
ql
(
νlt + ul,0(x)
)
.
Define u˜(x) = minq∈∆(L)
∑
l∈L q
l(νlt+ul,0(x)). According
to the dual theorem, given x, we have
u˜(x) =max
u˜∈R
u˜
s.t.νt + u:,0(x) ≥ u˜1,
where u:,0(x) satisfies (29-31) with the horizon to be n.
Therefore, following the same steps in the proof of Theorem
2 to show uˆ = u, we have
u˜(x) = max
u∈U,u:,0∈R|L|,u˜∈R
u˜
s.t.νt + u:,0 ≥ u˜1,∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA1 ,hB1 + ul,hA1 ,hB1
T
1 ≥ ul,01, ∀l ∈ L,
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ ul,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
T
1 ≥ uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
1,
∀t = 1, . . . , n− 1, l ∈ L, hAt ∈ H
A
t , h
B
t ∈ H
B
t .
8Hence, equation (49-52) is shown. Player 1’s security strategy
at stage t in dual game Γ˜2T (p, ν) can be seen as player 1’s
security strategy at stage 1 in dual game Γ˜2n(pt, νt). Hence, ac-
cording to equation (1), we have σ˜∗t (k, pt, νt) = x
∗
k,hA1 ,h
B
1
/pkt .
Following the same steps, we show equation (54-57) is also
true, and player 2’s security strategy at stage t is as in (58).
Now, let us get back to the primal T -stage repeated Bayesian
game ΓT (p, q). It was shown in [1], [9], [11] that if ν
∗ is the
optimal solution to maxν∈R|L|{V˜
2
T (q, ν) − q
T ν}, then player
1’s security strategy in type 2 dual game Γ˜2T (p, ν
∗) is also the
player’s security strategy in the primal game ΓT (p, q), and
that if µ∗ is the optimal solution to minµ∈R|K|{V˜
1
T (µ, q) −
pTµ}, then player s’s security strategy in type 1 dual game
Γ˜1T (µ
∗, q) is also the player’s security strategy in the primal
game ΓT (p, q). Since Lemma 3 shows that ν
∗ and µ∗ are the
regrets on player 2 and 1’s type, respectively, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 5. Consider a T -stage repeated Bayesian game
ΓT (p, q) and its dual games Γ˜
1
T (µ, q) and Γ˜
2
T (p, ν). Player
1’s security strategy σ˜∗ ∈ Σ, which depends only on t, pt and
νt at stage t, in type 2 dual game Γ˜
2
T (p, ν
∗) is also player
1’s security strategy in the primal game ΓT (p, q), where ν
∗ is
given in (37).
Similarly, player 2’s security strategy τ˜∗ ∈ T , which
depends only on t, µt and qt at stage t, in type 1 dual game
Γ˜1T (µ
∗, q) is also player 2’s security strategy in the primal
game ΓT (p, q), where µ
∗ is given in (36).
According to Corollary 5, we can compute player 1’s
security strategy in the following way. First, compute the initial
regret, ν∗, on player 2’s type. Stage by stage, update pt and
νt, and compute the security strategy based on pt, νt and t in
the dual game. Player 2’s security strategy is computed in the
same way.
Algorithm 6. Player 1’s security strategy based on fixed-sized
sufficient statistics
1) Initialization
• Compute u∗:,0 based on LP (11-13).
• Set t = 1, pt = p, and νt = −u∗:,0.
2) Compute player 1’s security strategy σ˜∗t at stage t
according to (53) based on LP (49-52).
3) Choose an action in A according to σ˜∗t , and announce
the action publicly. Meanwhile, read player 2’s current
action.
4) If t = T , then go to step 6. Otherwise, update pt+1 and
νt+1 according to (46) and (47), respectively.
5) Update t = t+ 1 and go to step 2.
6) End.
Algorithm 7. Player 2’s security strategy based on fixed-sized
sufficient statistics
1) Initialization
• Compute w∗:,0 based on LP (15-17).
• Set t = 1, µt = −w∗:,0, and qt = q.
2) Compute Player 2’s security strategy τ˜∗t at stage t
according to (58) based on LP (54-57).
3) Choose an action in B according to τ˜∗t , and announce
it publicly. Meanwhile, read player 1’s current action.
4) If t = T , then go to step 6. Otherwise, update qt+1 and
µt+1 according to (42) and (43), respectively.
5) Update t = t+ 1 and go to step 2.
6) End.
III. λ-DISCOUNTED REPEATED BAYESIAN GAMES
A two-player zero-sum λ-discounted repeated Bayesian
game, which is simply called discounted game or discounted
primal game in the rest of this paper, is specified by the
same seven-tuple (K,L,A,B,M, p0, q0) and played in the
same way as in a two-player zero-sum T -stage repeated
Bayesian game. The payoff of player 1 at stage t is λ(1 −
λ)t−1M(k, l, at, bt), where λ ∈ (0, 1), and the game is played
for infinite horizon. Correspondingly, the strategy spaces Σ
and T are defined for infinite horizon. The total payoff of the
discounted game with initial probability p0, q0 and strategies
σ and τ is defined as
γλ(p0, q0, σ, τ) = Ep0,q0,σ,τ
(
∞∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, l, at, bt)
)
.
The discounted game Γλ(p0, q0) is defined as a two-player
zero-sum repeated Bayesian game equipped with initial distri-
bution p0 and q0, strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function
γλ(p0, q0, σ, τ). The security strategies σ
∗ and τ∗, and security
levels V λ(p0, q0) and V λ(p0, q0) are defined in the same way
as in a T -stage repeated Bayesian game. Since γλ(p0, q0, σ, τ)
is bilinear over σ and τ , the discounted game Γλ(p0, q0) has
a value Vλ(p0, q0) according to Sion’s minmax Theorem [12],
i.e. Vλ(p0, q0) = V λ(p0, q0) = V λ(p0, q0).
A. Dual games, security strategies, and sufficient statistics
A discounted game is played for infinite stages, and the
history action space is infinite, too. It is not practical to design
behavior strategies that directly depends on history actions,
and it is necessary to find a sufficient statistics for decision
making. A candidate sufficient statistics in the discounted
game Γλ(p, q) is the belief state pair (pt, qt) [9], [1]. The belief
state pair is, unfortunately, not fully available to either player
after the first stage, since (pt, qt) depends on both players’
strategies according to (46) and (42). The objective in this
section is to find, for every player, the fully available sufficient
statistics and the corresponding security strategy that depends
on the sufficient statistics. We will use the same technique as
that in the T -stage game to find the fully available sufficient
statistics and the corresponding security strategies. Let us start
from the dual games of the discounted game.
A discounted game Γλ(p, q) also has two dual games. The
discounted type 1 dual game Γ˜1λ(µ, q) is with respect to the
first parameter p, where µ ∈ R|K| is the initial regret with
respect to player 1’s type. The discounted type 1 dual game
Γ˜1λ(µ, q) is played the same as in the T -stage type 1 dual
game Γ˜1T (µ, q), except that the discounted game is played for
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type. Player 1’s payoff is
γ˜1λ(µ, q, p, σ, τ)
=Ep,q,σ,τ
(
µk +
∞∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, l, at, bt)
)
.
The discounted type 2 dual game Γ˜2λ(p, ν) is defined with
respect to the second parameter q, where ν ∈ R|L| is the
initial regret with respect to player 2’s type. The discounted
type 2 dual game Γ˜2λ(p, ν) is played the same as in the T -stage
type 2 dual game Γ˜2T (p, ν), except that the discounted game
is played for infinite horizon. Let q be player 2’s strategy to
choose his type. Player 1’s payoff is
γ˜2λ(p, ν, q, σ, τ)
=Ep,q,σ,τ
(
νl +
∞∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, l, at, bt)
)
.
Both dual games, Γ˜1λ(µ, q) and Γ˜
2
λ(p, ν), have values de-
noted by V˜ 1λ (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ (p, ν), respectively. The game values
of the discounted dual games are related to the game value of
the discounted primal game in the following way [9].
V˜ 1λ (µ, q) = max
p∈∆(K)
{Vλ(p, q) + p
Tµ} (59)
Vλ(p, q) = min
µ∈R|K|
{V˜ 1λ (µ, p)− p
Tµ} (60)
V˜ 2λ (p, ν) = min
q∈∆(L)
{Vλ(p, q) + q
T ν} (61)
Vλ(p, q) = max
ν∈R|L|
{V˜ 2λ (p, ν)− q
T ν} (62)
Let µ∗ and ν∗ be the optimal solution to the optimal
problem on the right hand side of (60) and (62), respectively.
Player 2’s security strategy in discounted type 1 dual game
Γ˜1λ(µ
∗, q) is also his security strategy in the discounted primal
game Γλ(p, q) [9], [11], [1]. Player 1’s security strategy in
discounted type 2 dual game Γ˜2λ(p, ν
∗) is his security strategy
in the discounted primal game Γλ(p, q) [9]. The following
lemma tells us what µ∗ and ν∗ are. The proof is the same as
the proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 8. Consider a discounted game Γλ(p, q). Let σ
∗
p,q
and τ∗p,q be player 1 and 2’s security strategies, and x
∗
p,q and
y∗p,q be the corresponding optimal realization plans of player
1 and 2. Define
ul,0;λ(x) = min
τ(l)∈T (l)
E
(
∞∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1M(k, l, at, bt)|l
)
,
wk,0;λ(y) = max
σ(k)∈Σ(k)
E
(
∞∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, l, at, bt)|k
)
,
where x and y are player 1 and 2’s realization plans. The opti-
mal solution µ∗ to the optimal problem minµ∈R|K|{V˜
1
λ (µ, q)−
pTµ} is
µ∗k = −wk,0;λ(y
∗
p,q), ∀k ∈ K. (63)
The optimal solution ν∗ to the optimal problem
maxν∈R|L|{V˜
2
λ (p, ν)− q
T ν} is
ν∗l = −ul,0;λ(x
∗
p,q), ∀l ∈ L. (64)
Now that we’ve found the special initial regrets in the dual
games, our next step is to study players’ security strategies in
the dual games. With a little abuse of notation, in discounted
games, µt and νt are called the anti-discounted regret on
player 1 and 2’s types, respectively. In discounted type 1 dual
game Γ˜1λ(µ, q), the anti-discounted regret µt on player 1’s type
is defined as
µkt =
µk +
∑t−1
s=1 λ(1− λ)
s−1
E(M(k, l, as, bs)|k, h
A
s+1, h
B
s+1)
(1− λ)t−1
,
for all k ∈ K, t = 1, 2, . . ., and is updated as follows
µkt+1 = µ
+(µt, at, bt, zt, qt) =
µkt + λ
∑
l∈L q
l
t+1M
kl
at,bt
1− λ
,
(65)
for all k ∈ K, with µ1 = µ, where qt is the belief on player
2’s type defined as in (42), and updated as in (42).
In discounted type 2 dual game Γ˜2λ(p, ν), the anti-
discounted regret νt on player 2’ type is defined as
νlt =
νl +
∑t−1
s=1 λ(1− λ)
s−1
E(M(k, l, as, bs)|l, hAs+1, h
B
s+1)
(1 − λ)t−1
,
for all l ∈ L, t = 1, 2, . . ., and is updated as follows
νlt+1 =ν
+(νt, at, bt, rt, pt) =
νlt + λ
∑
k∈K p
k
t+1M
kl
at,bt
1− λ
,
(66)
for all l ∈ L, with ν1 = ν, where pt is the belief on player
1’s type defined as in (46), and updated as in (46).
Player 2’s security strategy in discounted type 1 dual game
can be found by solving equation (67), and depends only on µt
and qt at stage t. Player 1’s security strategy in discounted type
2 dual game can be computed by solving equation (68), and
depends only on qt and νt at stage t. The desirable property
of (µt, qt) and (pt, νt) is that they are fully available to player
2 and 1, respectively.
V˜ 1λ (µ, q) = min
z∈∆(B)|L|
max
a∈A
(1 − λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)
V˜ 1λ (µ
+(µ, a, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q)). (67)
V˜ 2λ (p, ν) = max
r∈∆(A)|K|
min
b∈B
(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)
V˜ 2λ (p
+(a, r, p), ν+(ν, a, b, r, p)). (68)
Finally, we are ready to investigate players’ sufficient statis-
tics and the corresponding security strategies in the discounted
primal game Γλ(p, q).
Corollary 9. [9] Consider a discounted game Γλ(p, q) and
its dual games Γ˜1λ(µ, q) and Γ˜
2
λ(p, ν). Let ν
∗ take the form of
(64). Player 1’s security strategy σ˜∗, which depends only on
(pt, νt) at stage t, in discounted type 2 dual game Γ˜
2
λ(p, ν
∗)
is also player 1’s security strategy in the discounted primal
game Γλ(p, q).
Similarly, let µ∗ take the form of (63). Player 2’s security
strategy τ˜∗, which depends only on (µt, qt) at stage t, in
discounted type 1 dual game Γ˜1λ(µ
∗, q) is also player 2’s
security strategy in the discounted primal game Γλ(p, q).
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B. Approximating the initial regret states µ∗ and ν∗
To compute players’ security strategies in the discounted
primal game, the first thing is to compute the initial regrets,
µ∗ = −w:,0;λ(y∗) and ν∗ = −u:,0;λ(x∗), which is a non-
convex problem in the variables [13]. Therefore, we consider
using the game value of a λ-discounted T -stage game to
approximate the game value of the discounted game with
infinite horizon, and further find approximated µ∗ and ν∗.
A λ-discounted T -stage repeated Bayesian game Γλ,T (p, q)
is a truncated version of the λ-discounted repeated Bayesian
game Γλ(p, q) in which the time horizon is T . We denote
the payoff and the game value of the truncated discounted
game as γλ,T (p, q, σ, τ) and Vλ,T (p, q), respectively. In game
Γλ,T (p, q), we define anti-discounted weighted future security
payoffs uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
and wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
for t = 0, . . . , T −1 as
follows
uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
(x) = (1− λ)−t min
τt+1:T (l)∈Tt+1:T (l)
∑
k∈K
xat
k,hAt ,h
B
t
E
(
T∑
s=t+1
λ(1 − λ)s−1M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1
)
,
wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
(y) = (1− λ)−t max
σt+1:T (k)∈Σt+1:T (k)
∑
l∈L
ybt
l,hAt ,h
B
t
E
(
T∑
s=t+1
λ(1 − λ)s−1M(k, l, as, bs)|k, l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1
)
,
where hAt+1 = (h
A
t , at) and h
B
t+1 = (h
B
t , bt), and the pairs
here indicate concatenation.
Notice that ua0,b0
l,hA0 ,h
B
0 ;λ,T
(x) and wa0,b0
k,hA0 ,h
B
0 ;λ,T
(y), also de-
noted as ul,0;λ,T (x) and wk,0;λ,T (y), are truncated versions of
ul,0;λ(x) and wk,0;λ(y), respectively. We can use ul,0;λ,T (x
⋆)
and wk,0;λ,T (y
⋆) to approximate ul,0;λ(x
∗) and wk,0;λ(y
∗),
and hence ν∗ and µ∗. Here, x∗ and y∗ are player 1 and
2’s optimal realization plan in game Γλ(p, q), and x
⋆ and y⋆
are player 1 and 2’s security strategies in game Γλ,T (p, q).
The following theorem provides linear programs to compute
ul,0;λ,T (x
⋆) and wk,0;λ,T (y
⋆).
Theorem 10. Consider a λ-discounted T -stage repeated
Bayesian game Γλ,T (p, q). Its game value Vλ,T (p, q) satisfies
Vλ,T (p, q) = max
x∈X,uλ,T∈U,u:,0;λ,T∈R|L|
∑
qlul,0;λ,T (69)
s.t.λ
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA1 ,hB1 + (1− λ)ul,hA1 ,hB1 ;λ,T
T
1
≥ ul,0;λ,T1, ∀l ∈ L, (70)
λ
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ (1− λ)ul,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1;λ,T
T
1
≥ uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
1, ∀t = 1, . . . , T − 1, l ∈ L,
∀ht+1 ∈ H
A
t+1, h
B
t+1 ∈ H
B
t+1, (71)
where hAt+1 = (h
A
t , at), h
B
t+1 = (h
B
t , bt), X is a set including
all real vectors satisfying (3-4), and U is a real space of an
appropriate dimension. The optimal solution x⋆λ,T is player
1’s optimal realization plan in game Γλ,T (p, q), and its anti-
discounted weighted future security payoff at stage 0 is the
optimal solution u⋆:,0;λ,T , i.e. u:,0;λ,T (x
⋆) = u⋆:,0;λ,T .
Dually, Vλ,T (p, q) also satisfies
Vλ,T (p, q) = min
y∈Y,wλ,T∈W,w:,0;λ,T∈R|K|
∑
k∈K
pkwk,0;λ,T
(72)
s.t.λ
∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA1 ,hB1 + (1 − λ)wk,hA1 ,hB1 ;λ,T1
≤ wk,0;λ,T1, ∀k ∈ K, (73)
λ
∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ (1− λ)wk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1;λ,T
1
≤ wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
1, ∀t = 1, . . . , T − 1, k ∈ K,
∀hAt+1 ∈ H
A
t+1, h
B
t+1 ∈ H
B
t+1, (74)
where hAt+1 = (h
A
t , at), h
B
t+1 = (h
B
t , bt), Y is a set including
all real vectors satisfying (5-6), and W is a real space of
an appropriate dimension. The optimal solution y⋆ is player
2’s optimal realization plan in game Γλ,T (p, q), and its anti-
discounted weighted future security payoff at stage 0 is the
optimal solution w⋆:,0;λ,T , i.e. w:,0;λ,T (y
⋆) = w⋆:,0;λ,T .
Proof. Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 1,
we have for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
(x) = min
τt+1(l,hAt+1,h
B
t+1)∈∆(B)
(
λ
∑
k∈K
xT
k,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
Mkl + (1− λ)1Tul,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1;λ,T
(x)
)
τt+1(l, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1),
(75)
wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T
(y) = max
σt+1(k,hAt+1,h
B
t+1)∈∆(A)
σt+1(k, h
A
t+1, h
B
t+1)
T
(
λ
∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ (1− λ)wk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1;λ,T
(y)1
)
(76)
Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 2, we
show Theorem 10 is true.
With u⋆(:, 0;λ, T ) and w⋆(:, 0;λ, T ) computed based on
(69-71) and (72-74), according to Lemma 8, we approximate
µ∗ and ν∗ as
µ† =− w⋆(:, 0;λ, T ), and (77)
ν† =− u⋆(:, 0;λ, T ), (78)
respectively.
C. Approximating the security strategies σ˜∗ and τ˜∗ in dual
games
Now that we have constructed an LP to compute the
approximated initial regrets µ† and ν† in the dual games, the
next step is to compute the security strategy in a discounted
dual game, which will serve as the security strategy of the
corresponding player in the discounted primal game.
Computing the security strategies and the game values
in dual games Γ˜1λ(µ
∗, q) and Γ˜2λ(p, ν
∗) is non-convex [13].
Therefore, we use the game values of truncated discounted
dual games to approximate the game value of the discounted
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dual games, and then compute approximated security strategies
based on the approximated game value.
A λ-discounted T -stage type 1 dual game Γ˜1λ,T (µ, q) is a
truncated discounted type 1 dual game V˜ 1λ (µ, q) with time
horizon to be T stages. Following the same step as in the
proof of Proposition 4.22 in [9], the game value V˜ 1λ,T+1(µ, q)
of the λ-discounted T+1-stage type 1 dual game Γ˜1λ,T+1(µ, q)
satisfies
V˜ 1λ,T+1(µ, q) = min
z∈∆(B)|L|
max
a∈A
(1 − λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)
V˜ 1λ,T (µ
+(µ, a, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q)), (79)
with V˜ 1λ,0(µ, q) = max{µ}. Moreover, since Γ˜
1
λ,T (µ, q) is a
dual game of Γλ,T (p, q) with respect to the first parameter p,
their game values satisfy
V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q) = max
p∈∆(K)
{Vλ,T (p, q) + p
Tµ}, (80)
Vλ,T (p, q) = min
µ∈R|K|
{V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q)− p
Tµ}. (81)
Similarly, a type 2 λ-discounted T -stage dual game
Γ˜2λ,T (p, ν) is the truncated version of discounted type 2 dual
game with time horizon T . The game value V˜ 2λ,T+1(p, ν) of the
truncated discounted type 2 dual game Γ˜2λ,T+1(p, ν) satisfies
V˜ 2λ,T+1(p, ν) = max
r∈∆(A)|K|
min
b∈B
(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)
V˜ 2λ,T (p
+(a, r, p), ν+(ν, a, b, r, p)), (82)
with V˜λ,0(p, ν) = min{ν}. The truncated discounted type 2
dual game Γ˜2λ,T (p, ν) is the dual game of the truncated dis-
counted game Γλ,T (p, q) with respect to the second parameter
q, and hence their game values satisfy
V˜ 2λ,T (p, ν) = min
q∈∆(L)
{Vλ,T (p, q) + q
T ν}, (83)
Vλ,T (p, q) = max
ν∈R|L|
{V˜ 2λ,T (p, ν)− q
T ν}. (84)
Based on the relations between the game values of the
discounted game, the truncated discounted game Γλ,T (p, q),
and their dual games, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 11. Consider a discounted game Γλ(p, q) and its dual
games Γ˜1λ(µ, q) and Γ˜
2
λ(p, ν), and a T -stage discounted game
Γλ,T (p, q) and its dual games Γ˜
1
λ,T (µ, q) and Γ˜
2
λ,T (p, ν).
Their game values satisfy
‖Vλ − Vλ,T ‖sup = ‖V˜
1
λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup = ‖V˜
2
λ − V˜
2
λ,T ‖sup (85)
Proof. First, we show that ‖Vλ−Vλ,T ‖sup ≤ ‖V˜ 1λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup.
According to equation (60) and (81), we have
|Vλ(p, q)− Vλ,T (p, q)|
=|min
µ∈R
{V˜ 1λ (µ, q)− p
Tµ} −min
µ∈R
{V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q)− p
Tµ}|.
Let µ∗ and µ⋆ be the optimal solutions to the optimal problem
minµ∈R{V˜ 1λ (µ, q) − p
Tµ} and minµ∈R{V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q) − p
Tµ},
respectively. If minµ∈R{V˜ 1λ (µ, q) − p
Tµ} ≥
minµ∈R{V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q) − p
Tµ}, then we have |Vλ(p, q) −
Vλ,T (p, q)| ≤ |V˜ 1λ (µ
⋆, q)− V˜ 1λ,T (µ
⋆, q)|. Otherwise, it is true
that |Vλ(p, q) − Vλ,T (p, q)| ≤ |V˜ 1λ (µ
∗, q) − V˜ 1λ,T (µ
∗, q)|.
Therefore, we have, for any p ∈ ∆(K) and q ∈ ∆(L),
|Vλ(p, q) − Vλ,T (p, q)| ≤ ‖V˜ 1λ (µ, q) − V˜
1
λ,T (µ, q)‖sup, which
implies that ‖Vλ − Vλ,T ‖sup ≤ ‖V˜ 1λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup.
Next, we show that ‖Vλ − Vλ,T ‖sup ≥ ‖V˜ 1λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup.
According to equation (59) and (80), we have
|V˜ 1λ (µ, q)− V˜
1
λ,T (µ, q)|
=| max
p∈∆(K)
{Vλ(p, q) + p
Tµ} − max
p∈∆(K)
{Vλ,T (p, q) + p
Tµ}|.
Let p∗ and p⋆ be the optimal solutions to the optimal problems
maxp∈∆(K){Vλ(p, q) + p
Tµ} and maxp∈∆(K){Vλ,T (p, q) +
pTµ}, respectively. If maxp∈∆(K){Vλ(p, q) + p
Tµ} ≥
maxp∈∆(K){Vλ,T (p, q) + p
Tµ}, then we have |V˜ 1λ (µ, q) −
V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q)| ≤ |Vλ(p
∗, q) − Vλ,T (p
∗, q)|. Otherwise, it is true
that |V˜ 1λ (µ, q) − V˜
1
λ,T (µ, q)| ≤ |Vλ(p
⋆, q) − Vλ,T (p⋆, q)|.
Therefore, we conclude that for any µ ∈ R|K| and q ∈ ∆(L),
|V˜ 1λ (µ, q) − V˜
1
λ,T (µ, q)| ≤ ‖Vλ(p, q) − Vλ,T (p, q)‖sup, which
implies that ‖V˜ 1λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖ ≤ ‖Vλ(p, q)− Vλ,T (p, q)‖sup.
Therefore, we prove the first equality of (85). Following the
same steps, we have ‖Vλ − Vλ,T ‖sup = ‖V˜ 2λ − V˜
2
λ,T ‖sup.
When we use V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ,T (p, ν) to approximate
V˜ 1λ (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ (p, ν), respectively, we are interested in how
fast the approximations converge to the real game values. To
this purpose, we define two operators F˜ 1 and F˜ 2 as
F˜ 1,V˜
1
z (µ, q) =max
a∈A
(1 − λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)
V˜ 1(µ+(µ, a, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q)), (86)
F˜ 2,V˜
2
r (p, ν) =min
b∈B
(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)
V˜ 2(p+(a, r, p), ν+(ν, a, b, r, p)). (87)
The two operators F˜ 1 and F˜ 2 are contraction mappings.
Lemma 12. Given any z ∈ ∆(K), r ∈ ∆(L) and λ ∈ (0, 1),
the operators F˜ 1 and F˜ 2 defined in (86) and (87) are
contraction mappings with contraction constant 1− λ, i.e.
‖F˜
1,V˜ 11
z − F˜
1,V˜ 12
z ‖sup ≤ (1− λ)‖V˜
1
1 − V˜
1
2 ‖sup, (88)
‖F˜
2,V˜ 21
r − F˜
2,V˜ 22
r ‖sup ≤ (1− λ)‖V˜
2
1 − V˜
2
2 ‖sup, (89)
where V˜ 11,2 : R
|K|×∆(L)→ R and V˜ 21,2 : ∆(K)×R
|L| → R.
Proof. Let a∗ and a⋆ be the optimal solu-
tions to the optimal problems maxa∈A(1 −
λ)
∑
b∈B z¯q,zV˜
1
1 (µ
+(µ, a, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q)) and
maxa∈A(1− λ)
∑
b∈B z¯q,zV˜
1
2 (µ
+(µ, a, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q)).
If F˜
1,V˜ 11
z (µ, q) ≥ F˜
1,V˜ 12
z (µ, q), we have
|F˜
1,V˜ 11
z (µ, q)− F˜
1,V˜ 12
z (µ, q)|
≤(1− λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)|V˜
1
1 (µ
+(µ, a∗, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q))
− V˜ 12 (µ
+(µ, a∗, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q))|
≤(1− λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)‖V˜
1
1 − V˜
1
2 ‖sup
=(1− λ)‖V˜ 11 − V˜
1
2 ‖sup.
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Otherwise, we have
|F˜
1,V˜ 11
z (µ, q)− F˜
1,V˜ 12
z (µ, q)|
≤(1− λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)|V˜
1
1 (µ
+(µ, a⋆, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q))
− V˜ 12 (µ
+(µ, a⋆, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q))|
≤(1− λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)‖V˜
1
1 − V˜
1
2 ‖sup = (1− λ)‖V˜
1
1 − V˜
1
2 ‖sup.
Hence, for any µ ∈ R|K| and q ∈ ∆(L), |F˜
1,V˜ 11
z (µ, q) −
F˜
1,V˜ 12
z (µ, q)| ≤ (1−λ)‖V˜ 11 − V˜
1
2 ‖sup, which implies equation
(88). Equation (89) is shown following the same steps.
Lemma 12 further implies that our game value approxi-
mations V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ,T (p, ν) converge to the real game
values V˜ 1λ (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ (p, ν) exponentially fast over T .
Theorem 13. Consider the λ-discounted repeated Bayesian
dual games Γ˜1λ(µ, q) and Γ˜
2
λ(p, ν), and their game values
V˜ 1λ (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ (p, ν). The game values V˜
1
λ,T (µ, q) and
V˜ 2λ,T (p, ν) of λ-discounted T -stage dual games Γ˜
1
λ,T (µ, q) and
Γ˜2λ,T (p, ν) converge to V˜
1
λ (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ (p, ν) exponentially
fast with respect to the time horizon T with convergence rate
1− λ, i.e.
‖V˜ 1λ − V˜
1
λ,T+1‖sup ≤(1 − λ)‖V˜
1
λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup, (90)
‖V˜ 2λ − V˜
2
λ,T+1‖sup ≤(1 − λ)‖V˜
2
λ − V˜
2
λ,T ‖sup. (91)
Proof. Equation (67) and (79) and the definition of F˜ 1 in (86)
imply that
|V˜ 1λ (µ, q)− V˜
1
λ,T+1(µ, q)|
=| min
z∈∆(L)
F˜
1,V˜ 1λ
z (µ, q)− min
z∈∆(L)
F˜
1,V˜ 1λ,T
z (µ, q)|.
Let z∗ and z⋆ be the optimal solutions to
the optimal problems minz∈∆(L) F˜
1,V˜ 1λ
z (µ, q)
and minz∈∆(L) F˜
1,V˜ 1λ,T
z (µ, q), respectively. If
minz∈∆(L) F˜
1,V˜ 1λ
z (µ, q) ≥ minz∈∆(L) F˜
1,V˜ 1λ,T
z (µ, q),
according to equation (88), we have
|V˜ 1λ (µ, q)− V˜
1
λ,T+1(µ, q)| ≤ |F˜
1,V˜ 1λ
z⋆ (µ, q)− F˜
1,V˜ 1λ,T
z⋆ (µ, q)|
≤‖F˜
1,V˜ 1λ
z⋆ − F˜
1,V˜ 1λ,T
z⋆ ‖sup ≤ (1− λ)‖V˜
1
λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup.
Otherwise, we have
|V˜ 1λ (µ, q)− V˜
1
λ,T+1(µ, q)| ≤ |F˜
1,V˜ 1λ
z∗ (µ, q)− F˜
1,V˜ 1λ,T
z∗ (µ, q)|
≤‖F˜
1,V˜ 1λ
z∗ − F˜
1,V˜ 1λ,T
z∗ ‖sup ≤ (1− λ)‖V˜
1
λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup.
Hence, for any µ ∈ R|K| and q ∈ ∆(L), |V˜ 1λ (µ, q) −
V˜ 1λ,T+1(µ, q)| ≤ (1 − λ)‖V˜
1
λ − V˜
1
λ,T ‖sup, which implies (90).
Equation (91) is shown following the same steps.
With the approximated values V˜ 1λ,T (µ, q) and V˜
2
λ,T (p, ν),
we can use them in equation (67) and (68), and derive player
1 and 2’s approximated security strategies σ˜† and τ˜† as
σ˜†(:, p, ν) = argmax
r∈∆(A)|K|
min
b∈B
(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)
V˜ 2λ,T (p
+(a, r, p), ν+(ν, a, b, r, p)), (92)
τ˜†(:, µ, q) = argmin
z∈∆(B)|L|
max
a∈A
(1 − λ)
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)
V˜ 1λ,T (µ
+(µ, a, b, z, q), q+(b, z, q)). (93)
Comparing equation (92) and (93) with equation (82) and
(79), we see that the approximated security strategy of player
1 in discounted type 2 dual game is the security strategy of
player 1 at stage 1 in T + 1-stage discounted type 2 dual
game, and the approximated security strategy of player 2 in
discounted type 1 dual game is the security strategy of player
2 at stage 1 in T + 1-stage discounted type 1 dual game.
Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 4, we
provide LP formulations to compute the approximated security
strategies σ˜† and τ˜† in the following theorem.
Theorem 14. Consider a T +1-stage λ-discounted dual game
Γ˜2λ,T+1(p, ν). Its game value V˜
2
λ,T+1(p, ν) satisfies
V˜ 2λ,T+1(p, ν) = max
x∈X,uλ,T+1∈U,u:,0;λ,T+1∈R|L|,u˜∈R
u˜ (94)
s.t.ν + u:,0;λ,T+1 ≥ u˜1 (95)
λ
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA1 ,hB1 + (1− λ)ul,hA1 ,hB1 ;λ,T+1
T
1
≥ ul,0;λ,T+11, ∀l ∈ L, (96)
λ
∑
k∈K
Mkl
T
xk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ (1− λ)ul,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1;λ,T+1
T
1
≥ uat,bt
l,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T+1
1, ∀t = 1, . . . , T, l ∈ L, ht+1 ∈ H
A
t+1,
∀hBt+1 ∈ H
B
t+1, (97)
where X is a set including all real vectors satisfying (3-4)
with xa0
:,hA0 ,h
B
0
= p, and U is an appropriately dimensional
real space. The approximated security strategy σ˜†(:, p, ν) of
player 1 in the discounted type 2 dual game Γ˜2λ(p, ν) is his
security strategy at stage 1 in the T +1-stage discounted type
2 dual game Γ˜2λ,T+1(p, ν), and is computed as below
σ˜†(k, p, ν) =
x⋆
k,hA1 ,h
B
1
pk
, ∀k ∈ K. (98)
Similarly, the game value V˜ 1λ,T+1(µ, q) of a T + 1-stage
discounted type 1 dual game Γ˜1λ,T+1(µ, q) satisfies
V˜ 1λ,T+1(µ, q) = min
y∈Y,wλ,T+1∈W,
w:,0;λ,T+1∈R
|K|,w˜∈R
w˜ (99)
s.t.µ+ w:,0;λ,T+1 ≤ w˜1 (100)
λ
∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA1 ,hB1 + (1− λ)wk,hA1 ,hB1 ;λ,T+11
≤ wk,0;λ,T+11, ∀k ∈ K, (101)
λ
∑
l∈L
Mklyl,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1
+ (1− λ)wk,hA
t+1,h
B
t+1;λ,T+1
1
≤ wat,bt
k,hAt ,h
B
t ;λ,T+1
1, ∀t = 1, . . . , T, k ∈ K,hAt+1 ∈ H
A
t+1,
∀hBt+1 ∈ H
B
t+1, (102)
where Y is a set including all real vectors satisfying (5-6)
with yb0
:,hA0 ,h
B
0
= q, and W is an appropriately dimensional
real space. The approximated security strategy τ˜†(:, µ, q) of
player 2 in the discounted type 1 dual game Γ˜1λ(µ, q) is his
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security strategy at stage 1 in T + 1-stage discounted type 1
dual game Γ˜1λ,T+1(µ, q), and is computed as below.
τ˜†(l, µ, q) =
y⋆
l,hA1 ,h
B
1
ql
, ∀l ∈ L. (103)
Corollary 9 says that player 1 and 2’s security strategies in
discounted primal game Γλ(p, q) are their security strategies
in dual game Γ˜2λ(p, ν
∗) and Γ˜1λ(µ
∗, q), respectively, where µ∗
and ν∗ are the solutions to the optimal problems on the right
hand side of (60) and (62). Now, we know how to construct
LP formulations to approximate the initial regrets, and players’
security strategies in the dual games. We give the algorithms to
compute the approximated security strategies for both players
as below.
Algorithm 15. Player 1’s approximated security strategy in
discounted game Γλ(p, q)
1) Initialization
• Set T , and read parameters: k, M , p and q.
• Given (p, q), compute u⋆:,0;λ,T according to the LP
(69-71).
• Set t = 1, p1 = p and ν1 = −u⋆:,0;λ,T .
2) Compute player 1’s approximated security strategy σ˜†(:
, pt, νt) according to (98) based on the LP (94-97) with
p = pt and ν = νt.
3) Choose an action in A according to σ˜†(k, pt, νt), and
announce it publicly. Read player 2’s action bt.
4) Update pt+1 and νt+1 according to (46) and (66),
respectively.
5) Update t = t+ 1 and go to step 2.
Algorithm 16. Player 2’s approximated security strategy in
discounted game Γλ(p, q)
1) Initialization
• Set T , and read parameters: l, M , p and q.
• Given (p, q), compute w⋆:,0;λ,T according to the LP
(72-74).
• Set t = 1, q1 = q and µ1 = −w⋆:,0;λ,T .
2) Compute player 2’s approximated security strategy τ˜†(:
, µt, qt) according to (103) based on the LP (99-102)
with µ = µt and q = qt.
3) Choose an action in B according to τ˜†(l, µt, qt), and
announce it to the public. Read player 1’s action at.
4) Update qt+1 and µt+1 according to (42) and (65),
respectively.
5) Update t = t+ 1 and go to step 2.
D. Performance analysis of the approximated security strate-
gies
With player 1 and 2’s approximated security strategies σ˜†
and τ˜† described in Algorithm 15 and 16, we are interested in
their worst case payoffs J σ˜
†
and J τ˜
†
. Given player 1’s strategy
σ ∈ Σ, its worst case payoff in discounted game Γλ(p, q) is
defined as
Jσ(p, q) = min
τ∈T
γλ(p, q, σ, τ). (104)
Similarly, given player 2’s strategy τ ∈ T , its worst case
payoff in discounted game Γλ(p, q) is defined as
Jτ (p, q) = max
σ∈Σ
γλ(p, q, σ, τ). (105)
Because players’ approximated security strategies in game
Γλ(p, q) are derived from the approximated security strategies
in its dual games, their worst case payoffs in Γλ(p, q) are
highly related to the worst case payoffs in the dual games.
We define player 1’s worst case payoff J˜2,σ in dual game
Γ˜2λ(p, ν) and player 2’s worst case payoff J˜
1,τ in dual game
Γ˜1λ(µ, q) as
J˜2,σ(p, ν) = min
q∈∆(L)
min
τ∈T
γ˜2λ(p, ν, q, σ, τ), (106)
J˜1,τ (µ, q) = max
p∈∆(K)
max
σ∈Σ
γ˜1λ(µ, q, p, σ, τ). (107)
Following the same steps as in the proof of (59-62) in [11], [9],
we can show the relations between Jσ(p, q) and J˜2,σ(p, ν),
and between Jτ (p, q) and J˜1,τ (µ, q) as below.
J˜2,σ(p, ν) = min
q∈∆(L)
{Jσ(p, q) + qT ν}, (108)
Jσ(p, q) = max
ν∈R|L|
{J˜2,σ(p, ν)− qT ν}, (109)
J˜1,τ (µ, q) = max
p∈∆(K)
{Jτ (p, q) + pTµ}, (110)
Jτ (p, q) = min
µ∈R|K|
{J˜1,τ(µ, q)− pTµ}. (111)
The worst case payoffs J˜2,σ and J˜1,τ satisfy recursive
formulas if σ and τ are stationary strategies, i.e. σ only
depends on pt and νt, and τ only depends on µt and qt.
Lemma 17. Let σ be player 1’s stationary strategy that
depends only on pt and νt in the discounted type 2 dual game
Γ˜2λ(p, ν). Its worst case payoff J˜
2,σ(p, ν) satisfies
J˜2,σ(p, ν) = F˜ 2,J˜
2,σ
σ(:,p,ν)(p, ν). (112)
Similarly, let τ be player 2’s stationary strategy that de-
pends only on µt and qt in the discounted type 1 dual game
Γ˜1λ(µ, q). Its worst case payoff J˜
1,τ (µ, q) satisfies
J˜1,τ (µ, q) = F˜ 1,J˜
1,τ
τ(:,µ,q)(µ, q). (113)
Proof. According to Bellman’s principle, we have
Jσ(p, q) = min
z∈∆(B)|L|

λ ∑
l∈L,k∈K
pkqlrk
T
Mklzl + (1− λ)
∑
a∈A,b∈B
r¯p,r(a)z¯q,z(b)J
σ(p+(a, p, r), q+(b, q, z))

 ,
where rk = σ(k, p, ν). From equation (108), we derive that
J˜2,σ(p, ν) = min
q∈∆(L),z∈∆(B)|L|

 ∑
b∈B,l∈L
qlzl(b)νl
14
+λ
∑
l∈L,k∈K,a∈A,b∈B
pkqlrk(a)Mklabz
l(b) + (1− λ)
∑
a∈A,b∈B
r¯p,r(a)z¯q,z(b)J
σ(p+(a, p, r), q+(b, q, z))


= (1− λ) min
q∈∆(L),z∈∆(B)|L|
∑
b∈B
z¯q,z(b)
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)
(∑
l∈L
q+l(b, q, z)
νl + λ
∑
k∈K p
+k(a, p, r)Mklab
1− λ
+Jσ(p+(a, p, r), q+(b, q, z))
)
.
Since qlzl(b) = q+l(b, q, z)z¯q,z(b) for any l ∈ L and b ∈ B,
the minimum function taken with respect to q ∈ ∆(L), z ∈
∆(B)|L| is the same as the minimum function taken with
respect to q+ ∈ ∆(L)|B|, z¯ ∈ ∆(B). Thus, we have
J˜2,σ(p, ν)
=(1− λ) min
q+∈∆(L)|B|,z¯∈∆(B)
∑
b∈B
z¯(b)
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)
(∑
l∈L
q+l(b)
νl + λ
∑
k∈K p
+k(a, p, r)Mklab
1− λ
+ Jσ(p+(a, p, r), q+(b))
)
=(1− λ) min
z¯∈∆(B)
∑
b∈B
z¯(b)
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)
J˜2,σ(p+(a, p, r), ν+(ν, a, b, r, p))
=(1− λ)min
b∈B
∑
a∈A
r¯p,r(a)J˜
2,σ(p+(a, p, r), ν+(ν, a, b, r, p))
=F˜ 2,J˜
2,σ
σ(:,p,ν)(p, ν).
The second equality is derived from (108).
Following the same steps, we can show that J˜1,τ (µ, q) =
F˜ 1,J˜
1,τ
τ(:,µ,q)(µ, q).
Based on Lemma 17, we are ready to analyze the per-
formance difference between players’ approximated security
strategies and their security strategies.
Theorem 18. Consider a discounted game Γλ(p, q). If player
2 uses σ˜† defined in (92) as his strategy, and follows Algorithm
15 to take actions, then his worst case payoff J σ˜
†
(p, q) satisfies
‖J σ˜
†
− Vλ‖sup ≤
2(1− λ)
λ
‖Vλ|T − Vλ‖sup. (114)
If player 2 uses τ˜† defined in (93) as his strategy, and
follows Algorithm 16 to take actions, then his worst case payoff
J τ˜
†
(p, q) satisfies
‖J τ˜
†
− Vλ‖sup ≤
2(1− λ)
λ
‖Vλ|T − Vλ‖sup. (115)
Proof. According to equation (109) and (60), we have
|J σ˜
†
(p, q) − Vλ(p, q)| = |maxν∈R|L|{J˜
2,σ˜†(p, ν) − qT ν} −
maxν∈R|L|{V˜
2
λ (p, ν)−q
T ν}|. Let ν∗ be the solution to the op-
timal problemmaxν∈R|L|{V˜
2
λ (p, ν)−q
T ν}. Since J σ˜
†
(p, q) ≤
Vλ(p, q), we have
|J σ˜
†
(p, q)− Vλ(p, q)| ≤ |J˜
2,σ˜†(p, ν∗)− V˜ 2λ (p, ν
∗)|
≤‖J˜2,σ˜
†
− V˜ 2λ ‖sup, ∀p ∈ ∆(K), q ∈ ∆(L) (116)
According to equation (112), (91) and (89), we have for any
p ∈ ∆(K) and any ν ∈ R|L|,
|J˜2,σ˜
†
(p, ν)− V˜ 2λ (p, ν)|
≤|J˜2,σ˜
†
(p, ν)− V˜ 2λ,T+1(p, ν)|+ |V˜
2
λ,T+1(p, ν)− V˜
2
λ (p, ν)|
≤|F˜ 2,J˜
2,σ˜†
σ˜†(:,p,ν)
(p, ν)− F˜
2,V˜ 2λ,T
σ˜†(:,p,ν)
(p, ν)|+ (1 − λ)|V˜ 2λ,T − V˜
2
λ ‖sup
≤(1 − λ)‖J˜2,σ˜
†
− V˜ 2λ,T ‖sup + (1 − λ)‖V˜
2
λ,T − V˜
2
λ ‖sup.
Thus, we have ‖J˜2,σ˜
†
− V˜ 2λ ‖sup ≤ (1−λ)‖J˜
2,σ˜†− V˜ 2λ,T ‖sup+
(1 − λ)|V˜ 2λ,T − V˜
2
λ ‖sup ≤ (1 − λ)‖J˜
2,σ˜† − V˜ 2λ ‖sup + 2(1 −
λ)|V˜ 2λ,T − V˜
2
λ ‖sup, which implies that
‖J˜2,σ˜
†
− V˜ 2λ ‖sup ≤
2(1− λ)
λ
‖V˜ 2λ,T − V˜
2
λ ‖sup.
After applying the above inequality to (116), we have for
any p ∈ ∆(K) and q ∈ ∆(L), |J σ˜
†
(p, q) − Vλ(p, q)| ≤
2(1−λ)
λ
‖V˜ 2λ,T − V˜
2
λ ‖sup, which implies that ‖J
σ˜† − Vλ‖sup ≤
2(1−λ)
λ
‖V˜ 2λ,T − V˜
2
λ ‖sup. According to equation (85), equation
(114) is shown.
With the same technique, equation (115) can be shown to
be true.
IV. CASE STUDY: JAMMING IN UNDERWATER SENSOR
NETWORKS
The jamming in underwater sensor networks is originally
modelled as a two-player zero-sum one-shot Bayesian game
in [14]. We adopt the game model in [14], and extend it
to a repeated Bayesian game with uncertainties on both the
sensors’ positions and the jammer’s position.
Let us assume that there are two sensors in the network
which send data to a sink node through a shared spectrum
at [10, 40] kHz. The distance from a sensor to the sink node
is either 1 km or 5 km. The shared spectrum is divided into
two channels, B1 = [10, 25] kHz and B2 = [25, 40] kHz.
Generally speaking, channel 1 works much better for a sensor
far away, and almost the same as channel 2 for a sensor close
by. The sensors need to coordinate with each other to use
the two channels to transfer as much data as possible to the
sink node in the presence of a jammer. The jammer’s distance
from the sink node is 0.5 km or 2 km. While the jammer
doesn’t know the sensors’ positions, the sensors don’t know
the jammer’s position either. For every time period, the jammer
can only generate noises in one channel, which can be detected
by the sensors. At the same time, the jammer can also observe
whether a channel is used by a far-away sensor or a close-by
sensor. The jammer’s goal is to minimize the data transmitted
through the two channels.
The sensors (player 1) have three types according to their
position distribution, which are [1 1] (type 1), [1 5] (type 2),
and [5, 5] (type 3). We consider [1 5] and [5 1] as one type. The
initial distribution over the three types is p0 = [0.5 0.3 0.2].
When playing the game, they have two choices, sensor 1
uses channel 1 while sensor 2 uses channel 2 (action 1)
or sensor 1 uses channel 2 while sensor 2 uses channel 1
(action 2). The jammer (player 2) has two types according
to his position, which are 0.5 (type 1) and 2
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TABLE I
TOTAL CHANNEL CAPACITY
❍
❍
❍
❍k
l
1(0.5 km) 2 (2 km)
1 ([1 1] km)
108.89 113.78 122.30 154.40
108.89 113.78 122.30 154.40
2 ([1 5] km)
11.48 107.38 24.89 107.42
99.04 20.15 100.26 60.77
3 ([5 5] km)
1.64 13.75 2.85 13.79
1.64 13.75 2.85 13.79
the initial distribution over the two types is q0 = [0.5 0.5].
His actions are jamming channel 1 (action 1) or channel 2
(action 2). Suppose both the sensors and the jammer transmit
with constant power 95 dB re νPa. A channel’s capacity can
be computed based on the Shannon-Hartley theorem with the
average under water signal-to-noise ratio described in [15],
[14]. The payoff matrices, whose element is the total channel
capacity measured by bit/s given both players’ types and
actions, are given in Table I.
We first consider a two-stage Bayesian repeated game
between the sensors and the jammer. Based on the linear
program (11-13), we compute the sensors’ security strategy
shown in Table II with a security level to be 162.49 bit/s.
According to the linear program (15-17), the jammer’s security
strategy is computed, and given in Table III. The jammer’s
security level is 162.49 bit/s which meets the sensors’ security
level. We then use the players’ security strategies in Table
II and II in the two-stage under water jamming game. The
jamming game was run for 100 times for each experiment, and
we did the experiment for 30 times. The total channel capacity
in the jamming game varies from 142.12 bit/s to 185.23 bit/s
with an average capacity to be 162.79 bit/s, which is very
close to the game value computed according to (11-13) and
(15-17).
Next, we would like to use security strategies based on
fixed-sized sufficient statistics in the jamming game, and
see whether we can still achieve the game value. First of
all, we need to verify Theorem 5. According to Lemma 3
and linear program (15-17) and (11-13), the initial regret µ∗
in type 2 dual game Γ˜2T (p0, µ
∗) is [−145.45 − 179.53],
and the initial regret ν∗ in type 1 dual game Γ˜1T (ν
∗, q0)
is[−234.77 − 141.44 − 13.38]. Player 1’s security strategy
in dual game Γ˜2T (p0, µ
∗) is computed according to the linear
program (49-51), and given in Table IV. We see that player 1’s
security strategy in dual game Γ˜2T (p0, µ
∗) is different from but
very close to player 1’s security strategy in the primal game
ΓT (p0, q0). The security level of σ˜
∗ in the primal game is
162.49 (checked by building a linear program the same as
(11-13) with x fixed), the game value of the primal game.
Therefore, σ˜∗ is player 1’s another security strategy. Player
2’s security strategy in the dual game Γ˜1T (ν
∗, q0) is computed
according to linear program (54-57), and given in Table V,
which matches player 2’s security strategy in the primal game
ΓT (p0, q0). We then run the two-stage under water jamming
game using security strategies based on fixed sized sufficient
statistics, and followed Algorithm 6 and 7 to take actions. For
each experiment, the two-stage under water jamming game
TABLE II
σ1∗
t
(k, hA
t
, hB
t
) IN ΓT (p0, q0)
P
P
P
P
PP
k
hA
t
, hB
t ∅, ∅ 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
1 0.43 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 0.18 0 0.23 0 0.39
3 0.44 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
TABLE III
τ1∗
t
(l, hA
t
, hB
t
) IN ΓT (p0, q0)
P
P
P
P
PP
l
hA
t
, hB
t ∅, ∅ 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
1 0.068 0 0.5 0 0.5
2 1 1 \ 1 \
TABLE IV
σ˜1∗
t
(k, hA
t
, hB
t
) IN Γ˜2
T
(p0, µ∗)
P
P
P
P
PPk
hA
t
, hB
t ∅, ∅ 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
1 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 0.18 0 0.25 0.068 0.38
3 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
TABLE V
τ˜1∗
t
(l, hA
t
, hB
t
) IN Γ˜1
T
(ν∗, q0)
P
P
P
P
PPl
hA
t
, hB
t ∅, ∅ 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
1 0.068 0 0.5 0 0.5
2 1 1 \ 1 \
was run for 100 times, and we did 30 experiments. The channel
capacity varies from 144.38 to 180.31 bit/s, with an average
capacity to be 162.32 bit/s, which is almost the same as the
game value 162.49 bit/s.
Finally, we test Algorithm 15 and 16 in the discounted
under water jamming game with discount constant λ = 0.7
to see whether the outcome satisfies our anticipation. In
the algorithms, we set T = 3, and Vλ,3 = 78.28 bit/s.
First, we found that the highest game value of a 3-stage
discounted game occurs at p0 = [1 0 0] and q0 = [0 1],
and ‖Vλ,3‖sup = 118.99 bit/s. Second, we found an upper
bound on ‖Vλ(p0, q0)‖sup. According to equation (85) and
(90), we have ‖Vλ − Vλ,3‖sup ≤ (1 − λ)3‖Vλ‖sup, which
implies that ‖Vλ‖sup ≤ 1/(1 − (1 − λ)3)‖Vλ,3‖sup = 122.29
bit/s. Third, we derive a lower bound on the security level
of the sensors’ approximated security strategy. According
to equation (114), (85) and (91), we have J σ˜
†
(p0, q0) ≥
Vλ,3(p0, q0) − 2(1 − λ)4/λ‖Vλ‖sup ≥ 75.44 bit/s. Finally,
we get an upper bound on the security level of the jam-
mer’s approximated security strategy. According to equation
(115) , (85) and (90), we have J τ˜
†
(p0, q0) ≤ Vλ(p0, q0) +
2(1 − λ)4/λ‖Vλ‖sup ≤ Vλ,3(p0, q0) + (1 − λ)3
∑∞
t=1 λ(1 −
λ)t−1154.4 + 2(1 − λ)4/λ‖Vλ‖sup ≤ 85.28 bit/s. Therefore,
our anticipated channel capacity in the discounted under water
jamming game is between 75.44 and 85.28 bit/s. Now, we run
the discounted under water jamming game (10 stages) for 100
times. For each run, we truncate the infinite horizon discounted
game to 10 stages, since the total channel capacity for the
truncated stages is less than 10−3 bit/s. The average channel
capacity is 82.15 bit/s, which is within our anticipation, and
16
verifies our main results in the discounted games.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian
games, and provides LP formulations to compute players’
security strategies in finite horizon case and approximated
security strategies in discounted infinite horizon case with
performance guarantee. In both cases, strategies based on
fixed-sized sufficient statistic are provided. The fixed-sized
sufficient statistics for each player consists of the belief over
his own type and the regret with respect to the other player’s
type. We are interested in extending the results to two player
zero-sum stochastic Bayesian games in the future. A main
difference between a repeated Bayesian game and a stochastic
Bayesian game is that there may not exist a Nash Equilibrium
in a stochastic Bayesian game if the transition matrix depends
on players’ actions [16]. Because of the difference, some
results in repeated Bayesian games may not holds in stochastic
Bayesian games, and hence further study is necessary.
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